Mobility implies two distributions and a transition process between these two distributions. A mobility index describes this transition. In most cases, mobility indices have been developed using properties of transition matrices independently of the concepts of inequality and equity that may also be used in the analysis. This paper presents a new tool -the Gini index of mobilitythat provides an overall consistent framework for the analysis of mobility, inequality, and horizontal equity. The theoretical concepts are illustrated empirically using panel data from rural Mexico.
Introduction
When discussing issues related to social welfare, sociologists have concentrated their attention on mobility as a factor determining inequality of opportunity. By contrast, economists have focused on inequality in income or consumption, often although not always without specific reference to mobility. Formally, if we consider a bivariate distribution representing an initial and a final distributions, an inequality index is a summary statistics defined over each marginal distribution, i.e. the initial and the final distributions. By contrast, a mobility index describes the transition process between these two distributions. Some economists (e.g., Shorrocks, 1978a; Atkinson, 1983; Dardanoni, 1993 ; see also Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1992 , for a review of empirical studies of earnings mobility) have proposed mobility indices to complement the tools used by statisticians and sociologists (e.g., Prais, 1955; Bartholomew 1982 ; see also Bibby, 1975 , for a review of the sociological literature). But in most cases, these mobility indices have been developed using properties of transition matrices, independently of the concepts of inequality and equity.
This paper presents a new tool -the Gini index of mobility -that, together with the Gini index of inequality, provides an overall consistent framework for the analysis of mobility, inequality, and horizontal equity. In so doing, we follow up on a few papers devoted to the relationships between the three concepts. For example, Shorrocks (1978b) shows how income mobility reduces inequality over time. King (1983) develops an index of mobility which can be decomposed into two components, one related to mobility, and the other to horizontal equity.
To motivate the paper and illustrate the relationship between mobility and inequality, consider the system of job rotation in the early days of the Kibbutz. Members of the Kibbutz rotate jobs. Hence, although at each given period of time there is no equality among members, inequality vanishes over time. Inequality is observed only because snap-shots are used to describe an otherwise lengthy process. Another example of the impact of the period of measurement on inequality is the distribution of income over the life cycle. If one is interested in life-time inequality, yearly inequality is inappropriate. Although individuals may have exactly the same pattern of income flow over the life cycle, one will observe inequality simply because the time period used for measurement is too short. A third type of transition over time is associated with uncertainty. If the distribution of income is affected by random shocks, the resulting process can be analyzed formally in the same way as job rotation, except that in the case of job rotation the transition is known in advance to the individuals, while in the case of uncertainty it is not. 2 In all these cases, a mobility index can help in predicting the appropriate level of inequality over a period of time from a series of snap-shots at any given point in time.
Mobility is also related to horizontal equity. Usually, transition processes take time, but we may also think of instantaneous transition processes with no time dimension attached to them. This applies to changes in incomes due to a reform in taxation. Traditionally, the changes in individual rankings before and after taxes have been analyzed through the concept of horizontal equity. The main principle of horizontal equity in tax reforms is defined by Feldstein (1976: 95) as "if two individuals would have the same utility level if the tax remained unchanged, they should also have the same utility level if the tax is changed." The implication of Feldstein's definition of horizontal equality (and to the best of our knowledge of all measures of horizontal equity), is that rank switching, i.e., the change in the ranking of individuals between the initial (before the reform) and final (after the reform) distributions, is an undesired property. The violation of this norm is the target of horizontal inequity measurement. Measures of horizontal equity are discussed among others in Atkinson (1979) and Plotnick (1981) . But clearly, the same rank switching is also the target of mobility measurement, except that mobility is viewed as a desired property to have. The information needed for calculating an index of horizontal equity is identical to that needed for calculating an index of mobility. As will be shown, the Gini mobility index is equivalent to the Atkinson-Plotnick measure of horizontal inequity.
The Gini mobility and inequality indices enable the identification of three separate factors at work when there is a change between two income distributions: growth, inequality and mobility. Growth is interpreted as a constant percentage increase in all incomes. A change in inequality occurs if one distribution deviates from the other by more than a multiplication by a constant. Mobility occurs when individuals change positions along the distribution. 3 Clearly, we could use alternative measures to capture inequality or mobility. The advantage of using an overall consistent framework is to insure that concepts are not mixed up in the process of measurement.
2 This type of problems may also occur when incomes are registered on a cash flow base rather than on an accrual basis. Different sources of income such as capital gains, farm income, and other types of capital income, which are registered according to realization, may have different accumulation and distribution patterns over time. Relying on snap-shots of the distribution may exaggerate the impact of those incomes on inequality in the long run. 3 For a alternative and interesting view, see Fields and Ok (1996) , who present an axiomatic characterization to absolute changes in incomes.
Another advantage of using the overall framework of the Gini is that mobility is not defined as an independent concept, and therefore, there is no need to derive a separate axiomatic justification for it. Any set of axioms that supports the Gini, such as those proposed by Ebert and Moyes (2000) , can also be used to support the mobility index. We will return to this argument in Section 3.
The Gini index of mobility has one more additional property, which is useful for discussing inequality. Consider the case of having two criteria for ranking the population, such as income and wealth. Each criterion enables the evaluation of a marginal distribution by a measure of inequality. Changing the criterion changes the observed level of inequality. What can be said if one is interested in a composite measure of inequality taking both criteria into account? One solution is to create a scale to weight the two criteria, and to compute the measure of inequality on a weighted average of the two variables. But in many circumstances there is no a-priori agreed upon weighting schemes and one has to search for an appropriate weighting scheme. To evaluate whether this is a serious problem, we state the conditions that enable us to predict the level of inequality when using a weighted average of two criteria, without assuming specific weights. That is, the Gini mobility index can also be useful in describing the change in ranking when one moves from using one criterion to the other.
The upshot from the above discussion is that many issues that involve transitions from one distribution to another can be represented by the same index. This is illustrated using panel data from rural Mexico. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the second section, we introduce the concept of the Gini index of mobility, in both its symmetric and asymmetric forms. We then discuss the connection between the Gini mobility index and transition matrices. Then, the use of the index is illustrated using information on rural Mexican households for income and wealth as measured by land ownership. Section 3 discusses the use of the Gini mobility index for predicting composite measures of inequality when the analyst is not able, or not willing, to specify the weights to be attributed to each factor in the composite measure of welfare. The empirical analysis in that section is devoted to the inequality of two functions, one depending on income and wealth, and the other depending on income at two points in time. Section 4 shows the equivalence between the Gini index of mobility and the Atkinson-Plotnick measure of horizontal equity, with an application to the impact on inequality and horizontal equity of a Mexican cash transfer program for farmers.
The Gini Index of Mobility

Definitions and properties
The most convenient way to define the Gini index of mobility is by using continuous distributions. However, since we want to analyze the relationship between the index and the literature on mobility, which relies on transition matrices, we will move back and forth from continuous to discrete variables to allow for matrix notation.
Let (Z 1 , Z 2 ) denote a bivariate income distribution in states 1 (initial) and 2 (final). It is assumed that first and second moments exist. Define Y j = Z j / µ j as the income in terms of mean income. Then (Y 1 ,Y 2 ) is a bivariate distribution with µ 1 = µ 2 = 1. A mobility index should describe the association between observations in distribution 1 and in 2. We distinguish between symmetric and asymmetric indices of mobility. An index S 12 , defined over distributions 1 and 2, is symmetric if it satisfies S 12 = S 21 , for any two distributions. The advantage of this property is that the index does not suffer from the index number problem that is typical to directional movement from one state to the other. The disadvantage of a symmetric index is that it requires more information than an asymmetric one. The Gini symmetric index of mobility is defined as:
where F j (Y) is the (marginal) cumulative distribution j. 4 The discrete version of the definition of the Gini mobility index in (1) is:
where y jk is the income of household k at time j and F jk is the normalized rank of observation k in the distribution at time j. As shown in the Appendix, the symmetric Gini mobility index in (1) is equal to: 4 In the sample, the estimator of the marginal cumulative distribution is the rank of the observation divided by the 
where G j = 2 COV(Y j ,F j (Y)) is the Gini coefficient for period j, and
is the Gini correlation coefficient Yitzhaki, 1987 and . 5 The properties of the Gini correlation coefficient that are relevant to this study are:
(a) The Gini correlation coefficient is bounded 6 , such that 1 ≥ Γ js ≥ -1; We also define the (directional) asymmetric mobility index M js = (1-Γ js ), where j is the initial state and s is the final state. The symmetric index is a weighted average of the two asymmetric indices:
where w i = G i /(G 1 +G 2 ) is the share of inequality of distribution or period i in the sum of inequality in the two distributions or periods. The properties of the various Gini indices of mobility are the following:
sample size, n. 5 Fields and Ok (2000) refer to this type of mobility measure as correlation-based mobility indices. An example of such an index is Hart's index discussed in Shorrocks (1993) . 6 An important property of the Gini correlation is that the bounds are identical for all marginal distributions. This property does not hold for the Pearson correlation coefficient (Schechtman and Yitzhaki, 1999) . Shorrocks (1978) . Note, however, that inequality can change between the initial and the final distributions. Examples of such cases are abundant: the application of a pure income tax so that the ranking of before tax income is identical to the ranking of aftertax income 7 or, alternatively, the effect of a tax reform that does not change the ranking of after-tax income. Another example is economic growth that affects all units by a monotonic increase of their incomes, as can be the case when the returns to schooling are changing (that is, distances between adjacent incomes increase or decrease), but the order (the education endowments) is not reversed. Still another example is a macro-economic shock that affects all individuals without causing changes in ranks. Note that although inequality can change even if there is no change in the rankings, inequality can't change between the two distributions if there is no change in incomes.
(b) Maximum mobility: assume that y 2k = t(y 1k ) for each k, where t() is a monotonic nonincreasing transformation, then Γ 12 = Γ 21 = -1 and S 12 = M 12 = M 21 = 2. Maximum mobility occurs if there is a total reversal in the ranks. That is, the richest in distribution 1 is the poorest in distribution 2, the second richest in distribution 1 becomes the second poorest in distribution 2, etc. In this case, the final distribution is derived from the initial distribution by a declining monotonic transformation. Note that in this case, mobility is independent of whether overall inequality increases or decreases between the initial and final distributions. investigators (e. g., Prais (1955) and his followers) defined independence as the extreme case of mobility. Shorrocks (1978a,b) on the other hand prefers to define property (b) as the extreme case. This distinction is not relevant for our purposes.
(d) Higher mobility: this corresponds to an increase in the Gini mobility indices. That is, the lower the Gini correlations between the initial and the final distributions, the higher the mobility.
Relationship with transition matrices
Students of mobility have traditionally analyzed transition and turnover matrices. 9 The main interest in this literature is occupational mobility, while the interest in this paper is in the impact of mobility on inequality. This difference in interest calls for slightly different approaches 10 . For convenience and without loss of generality, we divide the initial and the final populations into equi-proportional groups, so that the difference between a transition and a turnover matrix is a multiplication by a constant. In this section, we show, that provided that one is interested on the impact on the Gini index of inequality, then the Gini indices of mobility Γ js and Γ sj are sufficient statistics of the information contained in turnover and transition matrices.
This means that transition matrices do not add additional information over the informational content of the mobility indices. To show the relationship between the Gini indices of mobility and transition matrices, it turns out to be convenient to rely on discrete distributions. 11 Let y jk (j=1,2; k=1,..,K) be the normalized income (so that the mean income equals one) and let F jk be the normalized rank (the value of the empirical distribution, a number between zero and 1) of observation k in state j. Let also y j , F j be K x 1 vectors of normalized incomes and ranks in state j respectively. Without loss of generality, we will assume that the observations F jk are arranged in an increasing order of the ranking of the first period, that is, F 1 is the only vector whose elements must be arranged in a non-decreasing order. Since we are dealing with normalized incomes with unit mean, the Gini index of distribution j can be written as:
9 A turnover matrix is a matrix whose elements sum to one. A transition matrix is a matrix whose rows sum to one. Usually, transition matrices represent conditional probabilities while the elements of a turnover matrix represent the joint probability distribution of the two variables. 10 The mobility index that is the closest to the one suggested in this paper is Bartholomew's (1982) index of mobility, which is based on the expected value of the absolute difference in the values attached to categories in the initial and final distribution. However, Bartholomew's index is sensitive to the initial and final marginal distributions, and therefore, may give a misleading picture of the transition process. For example, assume that everyone in the society is promoted by one category. Bartholomew's index would indicate transition although there is no change in the ranking of members. On the other hand, the Gini mobility index is not affected by linear transformations of the marginal distributions. See Boudon (1973, pp. 51-54) for a discussion of the properties of Bartholomew's index. 11 Note, however, the important contribution by Geweke, Marshall, and Zarkin (1986) , who analyze mobility indices in continuous time.
where y' j is the transpose of the vector y j . Using the same procedure, the Gini correlation Γ js is:
Let T KK represent the transition matrix. Since we are interested in an inequality index, aggregation of observations into groups may cause the loss of intra-group inequality. Therefore, the size of the matrix will be required to be the size of the sample. In the sample, the transition matrix will be a permutation of the identity matrix, and it can take any shape that transition matrices are allowed to have. 12 Let t n,m be an element in transition matrix T. Then t n,m =1 if the observation with rank n in state j moved to rank m in state s. Otherwise, t n,m = 0. It is easy to see that for the vector of ranks, we have F' s = F' j T js , and F' j = F' s T' sj where j and s represent the initial and final distributions, and T' sj is the transpose of T js (since T is a permutation of the identity matrix, its inverse is identical to its transpose). The Gini correlation coefficient Γ js is defined as a function of the transition matrix as follows: Γ js = (y' j F s -0.5)/(y' j F j -0.5) = (y' j F j T js -0.5)/(y' j F j -0.5) .
The Gini correlation Γ sj is obtained in a similar way, and the Gini symmetric mobility index, which includes both Γ js and Γ sj , relies both on the transition matrix and its transpose.
Furthermore, assume that a population goes through two consecutive transitional processes, described by the transition matrices T 1 and T 2 . Then, the accumulated transition process over the two periods is A = T 1 T 2 . To compute the Gini indices of mobility over the two periods, one can proceed as before, using the matrix A as representing the overall transition process. An extension to more than two periods can be done in a similar way. This implies that one can study convergence and ergodic properties by using a series of Gini indices of mobility instead of the more complicated series of underlying transition matrices. The convergence of transition matrices to a given matrix will be equivalent to the convergence of the Gini mobility index to a given number. Although we will not work with transition matrices in what follows (since we do not need to), it is worth to briefly describe the special cases of the Gini mobility indices in terms of the transition matrix:
(a) Minimum mobility occurs if the transition matrix is the identity matrix. Hereafter I matrix.
(b) Maximum mobility occurs if the transition matrix is composed of ones in the diagonal which is opposite to the main diagonal and zeros elsewhere. Hereafter M matrix. If one has information on the Gini coefficient of one marginal distribution, then the Gini correlations represent the only informational content of the mobility matrix that is relevant for predicting the Gini coefficient of the other distribution. This does not imply, however, that having information on incomes and ranks in the first period, as well as information on the changes in ranks from the transition matrix as summarized by Gini indices of mobility, will be sufficient to predict inequality in the second period. To predict inequality in the second period, it would be necessary to know the incomes in the second period. But the Gini correlations remain sufficient statistics of the transition matrix with respect to the information that is available in the transition matrix for analyzing the Gini index of income inequality in the second period.
Empirical illustration
To illustrate the use of the Gini mobility indices (asymmetric and symmetric), we use panel data on income, land owned, land ownership, and cash transfers to rural farmers from a survey conducted by the World Bank in collaboration with the Secretaria de Reforma Agraria of Mexico. The survey was carried in 1994 and 1997 in rural areas, in the so-called ejido sector.
Until recently, Mexico's ejido sector was functioning under a system of communal property whereby land could not be alienated, rented or mortgaged, and usufructuary rights were The subset of the survey data that will be used in order to illustrate the properties of the We also use expansion factors and household sizes in the analysis in order to use the appropriate weights. Summary statistics for all the variables of interest are given in Table 1 . The mean quarterly per capita income is slightly higher in 1997 than in 1994 (in constant terms). The lack of growth in income between the two years is in large part due to Mexico's devaluation of December 1994 and subsequent economic downturn in 1995. There are a few households for which per capita incomes are negative, due to the possibility of losses in any given quarter for farmers (the cost of farm inputs may be larger than the revenues from the sale of outputs). These negative values do not represent any problem for the analysis, provided it is recalled that the Gini index of inequality can then be greater than one when the variable of interest has negative values (one such case will appear in the empirical analysis). On average, households own and cultivate two hectares of land per person. The standard deviation for the distribution of land is larger in 1997 than in 1994, as well as the maximum value of the land owned or cultivated. Finally, in 1997, Procampo payments amount on a per capita basis to 332.5 pesos per person on average, which is about 18.9 percent of average per capita income. 1997. Inequality has increased between both years for both income and land (whether owned or cultivated). There is also substantive mobility between the two years both in terms of income and in terms of land. The highest level of mobility is observed in land cultivated, perhaps in part because of the impact of land reform. Now that farmers can own their land, it is more easy for them to give it for cultivation to others without loosing their property. There is also a relatively high level of mobility in land owned, indicating that there are sales going on, also in part as a result of the land titling reform. Mobility is somewhat lower for per capita income, but nevertheless substantial given that only three years separate the two periods. The mobility in per capita income may be due in part to the fact that households having a bad quarter may have negative values in one year, but not in the other. The two asymmetric indices of mobility are fairly close to each other in all cases, which is an indication that there is likely to be exchangeability. The relatively high level of mobility hints that yearly observations suffer from high volatility, and that extending the time span of measurement can reduce the measured inequality significantly.
Predicting inequality for a linear combination of variables
Definitions and properties
One useful property of the Gini indices of mobility is that the indices help in estimating composite measures of inequality whereby the analyst is interested in the inequality of a then one might prefer not to be forced to assume a particular value for α. In this case, it is shown in the Appendix that the Gini of Y (α) is bounded as follows:
In a typical case, equation (8) It should be emphasized that the asymmetric mobility index is measuring the change in the ranks between the base period and the final period with income in the base period as the weighting scheme. Since the non-weighted average change in ranks is zero by definition, the deviation of the index from zero is caused by the correlation between the changes in ranks and the level of the in incomes in the base period. For any given household, an increase (decrease) in rank typically takes place together with an increase (decrease) in income. The asymmetric mobility index does not take this simultaneous change in incomes into account since it uses only the baseline incomes into account. Hence, the index (slightly) underestimates mobility for observations whose rank increase, and it (slightly) overestimates the impact for observations whose rank decrease. This is again the index number problem, and the lower bound in equation (8) is constructed by taking this property into account (see the Appendix for the proof). This property is also responsible for the fact that the two asymmetric mobility indices of the Gini need not have the same sign (i.e., the sign of the asymmetric mobility indices may depend on the choice of the base period).
Equation ( 
This shows that under exchangeability, the Gini behaves in a way similar to the variance 13 .
Equation (9) can be used to clarify our argument that having defined mobility in a Gini 13 Equation (9) can be adjusted to handle variables with non-equal means. The adjustment is to change the definition of α to be the share of the variable in the linear combination combination. That is s substitutes for α, where s framework implies that one can use the axiomatic justification of the Gini to serve as the axiomatic charactrization of mobility. To see this, assume that one adopts Ebert and Moyes' (2000) set of axioms to justify the use of the Gini index to measure inequality in each period, and to measure inequality in life time income, which is represented by Y(α). Mobility is then an index that connects yearly inequality to life time inequality. Therefore, the only axiomatic adjustment needed to use it is that one accepts the present value of life time income as an indicator of welfare.
Empirical illustration
Assume that both income and wealth determine the well-being of an individual in society, but the relative weights of the two factors can only be approximated. The joint distribution of income and wealth is known. Then one may want to evaluate the inequality of a combined index of these two variables without having to exactly specify the weight attached to each factor. In the case of rural Mexico, we can take the amount of land owned per capita as a proxy for wealth.
Using the values in Table 2 , and considering different values for α, one gets the results in the first part of Table 3 . The lower and upper bounds were computed using equation (8). It can be seen that in the case of income and land ownership, the lower and upper bounds provide a relatively wide interval because the Gini correlation between per capita income and per capita land ownership is not very high. An index of well-being which would take into account both income and land would thus result in a substantial reduction in the measured level of inequality.
Another application relates to inequality over time. If one wants to take into account two or more periods for computing the Gini index of inequality, one can do so without specifying the weights (in this case the discount rate) for the two periods provided one has computed the Gini asymmetric indices of mobility. The results of the simulations obtained for various values of α with the per capita incomes of the two periods are given in the second part of Table 3 . The predicted interval is smaller due to the relatively large Gini correlation of income for the two years. Still, given the results in Table 3 , it can be seen that income inequality could decrease by a maximum of 25 percentage points if two time periods were taken into account for estimating the indicator of economic well-being instead of one time period only.
=αµ 1 /(αµ 1 +(1-α)µ 2 ). The behavior of the Gini in this case is similar to the coefficient of variation. See the Appendix. Table 4 and Figure 1 provide the mid-point interval estimates for the composite Gini index taking into account incomes in both 1994 and 1997, as well as the predicted values under the assumption of exchangeability. The estimates under the exchangeability assumption perform very well and better than the mid-points for all values of α, so that the assumption can probably be used in a number of empirical assumptions. 
Mobility and Horizontal Equity
Definitions and properties
As pointed out by King (1983) measures of mobility can be applied to horizontal inequity as well. In our case, it turns out that the Atkinson-Plotnick index of horizontal inequity is a special case of the asymmetric Gini mobility index. That is, it can be shown that:
where AP indicates the Atkinson-Plotnick (Atkinson (1979) and Plotnick (1981) ) index of horizontal inequity, while b and a represent before and after reform distributions. As shown by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) , the other Gini correlation coefficient (i. e., Γ ab ) is also a key parameter in another index of horizontal inequity proposed by Kakwani (1984) . It was mentioned earlier the asymmetric mobility index may underestimate mobility when ranks increase, and overestimate mobility when ranks decrease because of the index number problem.
Given the similarity between the concepts of mobility and inequity, the index number problem also appears in indices of horizontal inequality. If one wants to impose symmetry on an index of inequity, it will be appropriate to use the symmetric version of the Gini mobility index. Table 5 provides the results of the impact of Procampo, the program of cash transfers to farmers, on income inequality in rural Mexico, and on horizontal equity. Without Procampo, the Gini index of inequality is 1.02 in 1997 (remember that with negative income values the Gini index can be greater than one). With Procampo, the Gini index of inequality is reduced to 0.830.
Empirical application
The Gini correlations between the incomes with and without Procampo are very high, so that the mobility indices are small, at 0.023 and 0.035 depending on which distribution is taken as the base. The index of horizontal equity of Atkinson-Plotnick, which is half the asymmetric mobility index when using the incomes without Procampo as the base, is small at 0.011, implying that Procampo results in fairly limited reranking in the population, in part because so many farmers benefit from the program, in proportion to the land they cultivate (which is itself positively correlated with per capita income).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a new index of mobility and its properties. The index provides a summary statistics for transition matrices. It is related to the Gini index of inequality and to measures of horizontal inequity, which is why we have termed it the Gini index of mobility. It is in the eye of the beholder to determine whether the attitude toward an increase in the index should be positive or negative. As we have argued, mobility and horizontal inequity can be viewed as representing the same formal process, except that mobility implies a positive attitude, and horizontal inequity a negative one. Another (well-known) conclusion of our work is that marginal distributions (snap-shots or distributions that are based on one attribute) tend to exaggerate overall inequality. Hence, if the interest is in some kind of convex combination of the marginal distributions, we should expect the inequality of the combination to be lower than the inequality observed from the marginal distributions. In other words, following on the work of Atkinson (1983) , Shorrocks (1978a,b) , King (1983) , and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1992) , we have shown that analyzing mobility can be interpreted as adding a dynamic and/or additional dimension to inequality analysis. In our framework, the links between mobility, inequality, and horizontal equity have been made explicit for the special case of the widely used Gini index.
The empirical applications, based on data from Mexico, have shown the wide applicability of the index. We have measured the extent of inequality and income mobility in the ejido sector of rural Mexico between 1994 and 1997; the impact of cash transfers programs on inequality and mobility, with a discussion of horizontal inequality; and how the tools presented can be applied to generate bounds for composite indices of inequality when the weights of the various components of the measure of welfare (such as income and land ownership) are not known.
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
APPENDIX:
Proof of Equation (3):
The symmetric mobility index is defined as follows:
Using the properties of the covariance, this can be written as:
Using the definitions of the Gini coefficient and Gini correlations completes the proof.
Proof of equation (8):
The proof consists of finding upper and lower bound for G Y(α) . The upper bound is
The derivation of the upper bound is based on Cauchy-Shwartz inequality, which can be utilized to show that for all Y j and
The lower bound obtains from the following:
Proof of Equation (9):
Equation (9) states that when the variables are exchangeable then:
As before, using the properties of the covariance we can write:
Under our assumptions (exchangeability between (Y 1 ,Y α ), (Y 2 ,Y α ), (Y 1 ,Y 2 )), we can assume that Γ ij = Γ ji for i, j=1,2, α), and substitute Γ kα by Γ αk (k=1,2 ). Then we can write Γ αk (k=1,2 ) in terms of covariances, and move the denominator to the left hand side of the equation.
Rearranging terms, and using Γ 12 = Γ 21 = Γ , we get Equation (9). Equation (9) can be adjusted to hold for distributions with different expected value. In this case:
Where s = α µ 1 / (α µ 1 + (1-α)µ 2 ), where µ i > 0, is the expected value of the appropriate variable. 
